Fink v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 1996) - Widow brought claim against insurer for life insurance benefits under her deceased husband's group policy sponsored by his employer. Prior to the employee's death, the employer changed group life insurance carriers, and under eligibility under the new policy required that the employee work full time employee (30 or more hours) at the regular place of the employer's business or at the regular place of operations. The Eighth Circuit found that the insurer thoroughly investigated the widow's claim and found that her late husband led a semi-retired lifestyle and rarely visited the office. He spent most of the preceding year outside the state where his employer regularly did business, and there was no indication that the employer asked him to go there. Tax records also showed that his salary decreased dramatically over the year he was away from the office and that he began receiving social security benefits. Given this evidence, the insurer properly denied benefits. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the insurer misled them into thinking that they were eligible for benefits. The evidence proved that the defendant informed the employer that they were adding the new requirement of full-time active employment when the employer switched policies, therefore, estoppel principles would not apply where there was no misrepresentation. Plaintiff also stated a claim of misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the insurance salesman who originally sold the employer the old policy. The district court held those claims were preempted by ERISA, and granted summary judgment to the individual defendant. The Eighth Circuit believed that the claim was preempted, and held that even if it were not, these state claims could not survive summary judgment because there was no evidence that the salesman did anything wrong when he sold the original policy to the defendant. Moreover, there was no evidence that he knew anything about the transfer from the old policy to the new policy until two years after the transfer had taken place. Addressing the potential ERISA liability against the salesman, the court held that individuals who merely provide professional services to plan administrators are not ERISA fiduciaries unless they "transcend their normal role and exercise discretionary authority." The defendant salesman was not involved in plan administration or investment, therefore the plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on an ERISA claim against him.