DiFederico v. Rolm Co., 201 F.3d 200 (3^rd Cir. 2000) - DiFederico appealed the district court’s denial of relief under ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. §  1140, a provision that makes it unlawful to interfere with the attainment of rights or benefits associated with an employee benefit plan.  DiFederico suffered from chronic fatigue and chronic colitis that affected her job performance.  She took short-term sick leave once in July 1991 and again from September 3, 1991 to November 18, 1991, when the Defendant fired her.

DiFederico claimed that Rolm terminated her to avoid paying long-term disability benefits. Rolm argued, however, that the reason for termination was DeFederico’s failure to return to work after it offered accommodations—a  new office job not requiring travel and situated near restroom facilities.  The central issue was whether Rolm’s proffered reason was a pretext disguising the real motive for termination.  In this appeal Plaintiff claims that the district court (1) applied an erroneous legal standard to her showing of pretext, (2) erred in requiring her to prove that her employer's intent to interfere was the sole cause of her termination, and (3) erred in finding that she had failed to prove that her employer's reason was pretextual.

This court affirmed the district court’s decision, first pointing out that the standard in § 510 cases requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant had the " 'specific intent' "  to violate §  510—in other words, that "the employer made a conscious decision to interfere with the employee's attainment of pension eligibility or additional benefits."  When the plaintiff offers no direct evidence of this decision, the court applies a shifting burdens analysis, similar to that applied in Title VII employment discrimination claims.  If the plaintiff is successful in demonstrating her prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant-employer, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the prohibited conduct.  If the employer carries its burden, the plaintiff then must persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's legitimate reason is pretextual.

Here, this court found that DiFederico failed to show that Rolm’s proffered reason was pretextual. This court disputed DiFederico’s assertion that the district court had erroneously required her to provide direct or "smoking gun" evidence.  It observed that the district court had merely suggested that, in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence must be compelling.  In this case the evidence was not compelling.

Using similar reasoning, this court also dismissed appellant’s argument that the district court erroneously required her to show that Rolm’s wrongful motivation was the sole cause of her termination.  She was merely required to persuade by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was pretextual.  As for DiFederico’s challenge to the court’s factual findings, this court applied a "clearly erroneous" standard and stated that the findings were not devoid of credible evidentiary support nor did they lack a rational relationship to the evidentiary data.