Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co., 207 F.3d 1143 (9^th Cir. 2000)-This appeal concerned whether a marital dissolution order constituted a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).  This court chastised the district court for exalting form over substance.  Ms. Stewart sued her ex-husband's plan after it failed to distribute her share of his interest pursuant to their divorce agreement.  The district court had ruled that the marital dissolution order was not a QDRO on the grounds that, among other things, it did "'not contain the alternate payee's (Plaintiff's) mailing address, nor the period to which such order applies.'"

This court noted precedents holding that courts should liberally interpret the QDRO address requirement in light of its purpose as an "'aid [to] plan administrators in identifying and locating alternate payees under a QDRO.'"  Moreover, the legislative history of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C) made clear that an order will not fail to be a QDRO "if the plan administrator knows or has reason to know the address independently of the order."  Here, the facts showed that the plan knew Stewart's address–her ex-husband was one of the plan’s trustees.

This court further found that the order met the other QDRO requirements, and that other circuits have favored liberal construction of QDRO requirements in general.  See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7^th Cir. 1994) and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Marsh, 119 F.3d 415, 422 (6^th Cir. 1997).  A marital dissolution order must specify, in addition to the participant's and alternate payee's addresses: "(ii) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid by the plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in which such amount or percentage is to be determined, (iii) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and (iv) each plan to which such order applies."  29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(i)-(iv).  Here, the order's statement that Stewart was owed "one-half of the community interest" in her ex-husband's ERISA plan was sufficient to state the percentage under (ii). As for (iii), the fact that the plan was a defined contribution plan (and distribution would be lump-sum) meant a description of payments was superfluous.

This court concluded that even assuming that the marital dissolution order failed to qualify as a QDRO, Stewart nevertheless had standing to bring her action because, by failing to perform their fiduciary duties under ERISA, defendants denied Stewart the opportunity to protect her rights and interests as an alternate payee under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G), (H).  Specifically, upon receipt of "any domestic relations order" - such as the Marital Dissolution Order in this case - a plan administrator must "promptly notify the participant and any other alternate payee of the receipt of such order" and advise them of "the plan's procedures for determining" whether the order is a QDRO.  29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i).  The Thorpe administrator failed to provide such notice.