McMurtry v. Paul Revere Life Insur. Co., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14068 (6^th Cir. June 12, 2000) (unpublished)-This court reversed the district court's judgment holding that McMurtry had a "vested" entitlement to lifetime total disability benefits. McMurtry, an emergency-room physician, suffered a back injury which, although it continued to plague him with pain, did not prevent him from working part time as an "urgent-care" physician. For many years, his ability to continue working did not disturb his receipt of total disability benefits, since he had purchased a rider to his policy which effectively eliminated the requirement that he not be gainfully employed. However, the rider lasted only until his 65^th birthday. At the time of this case, McMurtry was over 65, and was therefore once again subject to the original definition of "total disability."

The district court apparently implied "vesting" by interpreting the rider to mean that its definitions, not a recipient's benefits, ended on a recipient's 65^th birthday.  In other words, had McMurtry not become totally disabled before his 65th birthday or had he stopped being totally disabled after his 65th birthday, then he would have had to meet the definition of total disability in the original policy. Otherwise, he would be entitled to lifetime benefits (having, in effect, won the gamble in purchasing the rider).

This court found no basis for such an interpretation. An insurer must clearly state its intention to vest benefits in an insured policy and in explicit terms. See Sprague v. General Motors Corp.., 133 F.3d 388, 400 (6^th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 923 (1998).  Finally, on the issue of attorneys' fees, this court noted that under ERISA, a court must articulate its method of calculation, and may not pick an arbitrary amount.