Cavegn v. Twin City Pipe Trades Pension Plan, 223 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2000)-On October 28, 1994, Cavegn suffered a back injury at work. Cavegn then applied for disability pension benefits. On October 30, 1995, the plan administrator denied Cavegn's application after concluding that he failed to demonstrate that he was totally disabled. Cavegn appealed the administrator's decision to the plan's trustees, but the trustees rejected his appeal. Cavegn once again appealed the plan's denial and, on May 31, 1996, the trustees once again affirmed the denial.
In October of 1996, Cavegn again requested disability benefits. The plan's trustees ordered Cavegn to complete a vocational assessment and functional capacity evaluation. Shortly after completing them, the plan's executive administrator, sent a letter stating that "due to the new information provided by you [Cavegn], and provided through a vocational assessment[,] the Trustees are treating this as a new application for disability pension." The trustees denied Cavegn's application on January 28, 1997.
Steven Trobiani, M. D., examined Cavegn. Dr. Trobiani concluded that absent surgery to remove a ruptured disk in Cavegn's back, Cavegn was not "a candidate for employment in any capacity and would be considered permanently and totally disabled." Cavegn then appealed the plan's January 28, 1997 denial. Cavegn included Dr. Trobiani's report. On June 2, 1997, the trustees reversed the January 28 decision and awarded Cavegn a disability pension. The plan informed Cavegn that the pension would operate retroactively from November 1, 1996 -"the first day of the month following the determination by the Trustees that you have shown you satisfied the Plan criteria."
Cavegn appealed the plan's decision as to the starting date of his pension and asked that the pension award apply retroactively to October 28, 1994. The trustees denied Cavegn's appeal, concluding that he had failed to "satisfy the criteria for a disability retirement as of October 28, 1994." On June 26, 1998, Cavegn sued to recover the disputed retroactive pension benefits from the plan. The district court concluded that a two-year statute of limitations barred Cavegn’s claims. Cavegn appealed.
ERISA contains no statute of limitations governing claims for plan benefits. See Adamson v. Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650, 652 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 823, 133 L. Ed. 2d 42, 116 S. Ct. 85 (1995). Consequently, courts must "borrow" the statute of limitations from the most analogous state law. See id. To determine the most analogous state law, the Eight Circuit regards ERISA benefit claims as contract actions. See Bennett v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 837, 838 (8th Cir. 1998). Hence, state contract law provides the applicable statute of limitations. In this case, the most analogous Minnesota law is Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5) (Supp. 2000), which provides for a two-year statute of limitations in contract actions for unpaid benefits. See Adamson, 44 F.3d at 652-53; Kiefer v. Ceridian Corp., 976 F. Supp. 829, 841 (D. Minn. 1997). Cavegn sued on June 26, 1998. In accordance with Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5), the statute barred Cavegn's claims if they accrued before June 26, 1996.
While
state law governs statute of limitations questions for ERISA benefit claims
federal law controls the question of claim accrual.
See Bennett,
141 F.3d at 838. A cause of
action for plan benefits accrues after a plan fiduciary has formally denied an
applicant's claim for benefits or "when there has been a repudiation by the
fiduciary which is clear and made known to the beneficiary." Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Beckham, 138 F.3d
325, 330 (8th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 817, 142 L. Ed. 2d 43, 119 S. Ct. 56 (1998).
Cavegn contended that his October 1996 request was a new application and that his cause of action with regard to that application did not accrue until the plan administrator formally rejected his request. The trustees urged a rejection of Cavegn's new application argument. They contended that Cavegn's new application position ran contrary to Mason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1990). In Mason, the Eighth Circuit held that a plan administrator's eventual reconsideration of a beneficiary's application did not toll the statute of limitations. See id. at 664. The trustees argued that despite Cavegn's characterization of the October 1996 petition as a new application, the administrator in this case, like the administrator in Mason, simply engaged in a reconsideration of Cavegn's earlier requests; a reconsideration the Eighth Circuit encourages.
In the January 28, 1997 letter, the plan's administrator specifically stated that the trustees were treating Cavegn's October 1996 application as a new application. A new application is different and separate from any previous application. It is not a reconsideration of an old application or a reevaluation of a prior claim.
Accordingly, Cavegn's cause of action arising from the October 1996 application did not accrue until the trustees formally denied the application on January 28, 1997.